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Introduction
Brandeis High School was located on 84th Street in an area of Manhattan known as the Upper West Side. However,
84th Street was not always the Upper West Side. Historically, 84th Street and the area surrounding it were primarily
comprised of low-income African American, Haitian, Latino, and White residents. Like so many other neighborhoods
of New York City, as a result of multiple waves of gentrification, the area is now comprised of a percentage of
affluent residents, the majority of whom are White. Amidst these neighborhood shifts, however, Brandeis continued
to serve low-income students and students of color until 2009, when the New York City Department of Education
(NYCDOE) decided that it was a failing school and slated it to be phased out, or closed.[1]
Brandeis was one of several large, comprehensive high schools in New York City. It was also the case study for
Michelle Fine’s seminal Framing Dropouts.[2] To a large extent, the conditions that Fine documented over twenty
years ago have not considerably changed over time: Brandeis continued both to be under-resourced and to serve a
student body that was predominantly low-income and Black and Latino.[3] The school also served a large number of
English language learners as well as students with special needs. Brandeis was among over 100 schools that were
closed during Michael Bloomberg’s tenure as Mayor.[4] In many ways, Brandeis is representative of a forgotten or
abandoned place, which Ruth Wilson Gilmore describes as “planned concentrations or sinks—of hazardous
materials and destructive practices that are in turn sources of group-differentiated vulnerabilities to premature death
….” [5]
During the phase out of Brandeis, as the students slowly disappeared, the question arose as to what should be built
in the space. And it was during this time that Brandeis—or more precisely, the building that once housed Brandeis—
transformed from being a place that was once forgotten and never sought after, to one that became fought over.
Several scholars have drawn upon David Harvey’s articulation of accumulation by dispossession to highlight the
relationships between restructuring in education, the increasingly explicit role of market forces that permeate statedriven education reforms, and the gentrification of urban neighborhoods.[6] Building upon the work of these scholars,
we use historical and ethnographic methods to examine what the case of Brandeis might tell us about how the
continued production of what Gilmore terms “group differentiated vulnerability to premature death”[7] occurs in
tandem through urban renewal and education reform.[8]
In the sections that follow, we trace state-driven education reforms and urban renewal programs that moved through
Brandeis and through the Upper West Side over the course of several decades. We begin with an examination of
how the education reforms that claimed to fix Brandeis only allowed for a continued dispossession. While these
reforms ensured that the world inside Brandeis remained consistent over time, the world outside the building was
changing rapidly. We chart how urban renewal programs for the Upper West Side facilitated a gradually increasing
disjuncture between the school and its surrounding community. Finally, we interrogate the cultural logic that
undergirded the negotiation of this disjuncture during what we term the postmortem period of Brandeis phase out.[9]
A History of Reform
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In this section we use Brandeis to examine the contradictory dimensions of decades of state-driven education
reforms. By tracing these reforms as they were implemented at Brandeis, we hope to demonstrate that the current
crisis in education is neither a new nor an accidental phenomenon. Rather, the very same reforms that claimed to fix
so-called failing schools like Brandeis only ensured a slow and steady, yet aggressive dispossession.
The official discourse of education reform over the past four decades might best be described as variations on a
theme, and can be traced back to the 1983 report A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Education Reform, issued by
the Reagan Administration’s National Commission on Educational Excellence.[10] The report arrived on the heels of
the 1970s fiscal crisis. By 1982, the year preceding the report’s publication, unemployment had reached 10.8
percent nationally, and in 1980, inflation had hit 13.5 percent as a yearly average, the highest it had been since
1947.[11] As noted by Michael W. Apple, during this time education became a key dumping ground through which
these realities were explained and rationalized.[12] Indeed, a major claim made by the report stated that the “rising
tide of mediocrity that threatens our very future as a Nation and a people” was due to a failing education system that
could be fixed through reforms that focused on four key areas, central among which was the development of uniform
and measurable standards. [13]
Standards were presented as an appeal to excellence and to the promise of meritocracy offered by the dominant
narrative of public education as the “great equalizer.” [14] One of the primary ways standards were to be measured
was through the implementation of high-stakes tests, an instrument for student evaluation that are termed as such
due to their role in determining specific consequences for students, including promotion in grade levels. [15] Coupled
with calls for standards and accountability were debates over the role of the state, and specifically the federal
government, in education. In the years following A Nation at Risk, presidential administrations would shape the rise
of what has come to be termed the “accountability regime.” This regime grew considerably during the Clinton years,
as a result of the Goals 2000 program, which focused on accountability and allowed states to design their own
academic standards and tests.[16] Goals 2000 would ultimately not create new mandates, but was considered a
watershed moment in which there was, as Patrick J. McGuinn suggests, a “fundamental break with the historical
federal education focus on promoting access and equity for disadvantaged groups and initiated a new era in which
the federal government would emphasize academic improvement for all students.”[17] The “accountability regime”
then, marked a shift to measurement, metrics, punitive consequences for “failure.”
The George W. Bush administration’s No Child Left Behind Act, and its accompanying calls for testing and funding
tied to accountability (promoted by Goals 2000), was integral to the solidification of the accountability regime. No
Child Left Behind (NCLB) made high-stakes tests mandatory for all public school students in grades three through
eight.[18] NCLB also expanded the range of those impacted by these tests to include individual school workers as
well as entire school communities.[19] Advocates of NCLB echoed the rationale for reform advanced by A Nation at
Risk and identified public education as a major culprit that was to blame for societal problems. Significantly, race and
class were particularly highlighted by the Bush administration’s official discourse on NCLB, and the administration
promised to close the achievement gap for low-income students and students of color by increasing accountability
from schools. The market-based ideology of standards and accountability put forth by A Nation at Risk and Goals
2000 was woven through the policy guidelines and mechanisms of NCLB. For example, provisions included in
NCLB allowed for testing to emerge as the single instrument of assessment of student progress; teachers at schools
that failed to demonstrate improvement (or Adequate Yearly Progress) could be fired, and schools could be closed.
Despite the rhetoric surrounding these reforms—of providing equal opportunity and greater accountability—the
combination of uniform standards and high-stakes tests have instead increased inequities in educational
achievement, access, and outcomes.[20] This contradiction has been particularly pronounced in New York City,
where in 2002 Mayor Michael Bloomberg introduced the Children First initiative, which, among other measures, recentralized the nation’s largest school system.[21] Within this reconfiguration of governance, the Bloomberg
administration made significant use of NCLB provisions to utilize test scores to aggressively penalize schools, such
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as Brandeis, that were deemed to be underperforming.
The NYCDOE’s decision to close Brandeis was accompanied by a decision that three small schools would be
opened in the building. Brandeis’s student population, which began being phased out in 2009, would steadily be
replaced by growing student populations at these new schools. Small schools is a term used to refer to an
educational reform movement that started in the 1970s and was led by progressive educators who sought to disrupt
the model of large, comprehensive high schools—like Brandeis—which they assessed to be representative of a
factory style of schooling that only warehoused low-income students. As an alternative, they called for the creation of
small, innovative schools that emphasized progressive pedagogy and curricula, building community within the
school, and growing relationships among students, teachers, families, and the school’s surrounding community.
Over the past decade, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation has identified small schools as a key prototype for
investment, and as a result, small schools have rapidly expanded across the country. In their book Small Schools:
Public School Reform Meets the Ownership Society, scholar-activists and veteran small-school advocates Michael
and Susan Klonsky trace the ways that the small-schools movement has been hijacked within the context of
restructuring ushered in by NCLB:

The launching of scores of new small and charter schools in Chicago cannot be understood apart
from community economic redevelopment and the effort to make the city an important hub in the
global economy …. Chicago’s small-schools movement was, from its inception, tied by many strings
to the city’s redevelopment plans and therefore represented a collage of educational and political
forces, including business and educational interests ….[22]

Among the small schools that opened in 2010, as Brandeis was being phased out, was Frank McCourt High School.
According to news articles, Frank McCourt High School was “highly anticipated by middle and upper class families
on the Upper West Side who want a selective school close to home.” It was also heavily supported by state and
local officials who claimed it responded to a demand for a second “high performing” high school in the
neighborhood.[23] According to early documents announcing the school, admission to Frank McCourt was at first
designed to be “selective,” where admissions criteria were largely dependent on students’ high test scores.
However, as the result of organizing by social-justice groups, parents, and activists, admissions criteria was
established that ensured that a significant percentage of students served by Frank McCourt would be similar in
demographic characteristics to former Brandeis students, and that admissions to the school would be evaluated
based on factors that extended beyond test scores.
While the Frank McCourt plan was interrupted, another plan for the building was soon introduced. Success Charter
Network (SCN), a fast-growing New York City–based charter-school management company, proposed that a new
elementary school—called Upper West Success Academy (UWS)—be opened in the Brandeis building.[24] Over the
last decade, an increasing number of federal, state, and local governments have promoted the establishment of
charter schools, a trend hat has resulted in considerable and patterned growth in New York City as well as in
Chicago and New Orleans. In these cities, as several have documented, high concentrations of charter schools are
also often linked to processes of gentrification through similar alignments as those identified above by Klonsky and
Klonsky.[25] In New York City, charter schools often bid on portions of space within public-school buildings that are
determined (by a panel appointed by the mayor) to be underutilized spatially either as the result of under-enrollment
or when a school—like Brandeis—is being phased out and as a consequence, space is available.[26]
SCN’s 2010 bid on a portion of space within the Brandeis building was successful, and their expansion was
embedded within yet another reform that claimed to fix public schools: the Race to the Top Fund (also known as the
“education stimulus”), which was part of the Obama administration’s American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of
2009. Race to the Top (RTTT) allocated a $4.35 billion increase in federal funding for education. However, these
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monies were not evenly distributed among the states.[27] Rather, states were required to compete against one
another for funding. Further, similar in design to structural adjustment programs, RTTT linked needed funds to
significant policy changes. [28] According to RTTT guidelines, states were eligible to compete for funds as long as
they were able to meet a set of requirements. For example, New York State was ineligible to apply to RTTT until it
did away with particular provisions which limited the number of charter schools that could exist at one time, and
which barred students’ test scores from determining teachers’ salaries. In order to be able to compete for funding,
New York State raised the cap from 200 statewide charter schools to 460, and also did away with provisions that
prevented merit-pay programs for teachers. Between 2010 and 2012, New York State received nearly $700 million
from Race to the Top monies.[29]
As we will see, similar to the initial intention of Frank McCourt High School, UWS also billed itself as a solution to the
failure of public education that Brandeis was supposed to represent. And getting rid of low income students of color
was key to the particulars of the solution posed by UWS. But first, it is useful to look back to the history of urban
renewal that produced Brandeis to begin with, which culminated in a situation where Brandeis’s Black and Brown
students became an anomaly on the Upper West Side.
Disjuncture: Brandeis High and the Production of the Upper West Side
In this section, we examine—and problematize—the location of Brandeis within a shifting urban landscape. We
follow the urban renewal programs that moved through Brandeis and the Upper West Side to demonstrate how
Brandeis High School (1965–2012) went from being an institution whose student population reflected the racial and
economic demographics of its surrounding neighborhood to an institution that came to represent a disjuncture of
space and race, as those inside the school and those outside the school grew increasingly dissimilar.
Before Brandeis, there was the High School of Commerce. Opened in 1901, Commerce was located on West 65th
Street between West End Avenue and Broadway in Lincoln Square, which is the southernmost section of the Upper
West Side. Established when attendance at high school was still a luxury, Commerce reflected a larger ideological
and philosophical struggle over the purposes, designs, and leadership of school and school reform. In the early
twentieth century, the task of education reform was led by a cadre of college professors and educational
professionals. Described historically as the “administrative progressives,” this class of men were seen as education
experts. They would focus on reorganizing schooling to reflect a Taylor-ist factory model, focused on efficiency as
the optimal framework for aligning education with the ever expanding industrial economy of the time, and reaching
the rapidly growing population of new Americans who were landing at the boat docks everyday. [30] Multimillionaire
Andrew Carnegie was invited to speak at the laying of the cornerstone of Commerce, where he noted that the school
would be a place where “the son of the laborer enters upon exactly the same terms as the son of the millionaire,”
and that the school was representative of the United States’ path to ultimately becoming “the great manufacturer and
explorer of articles in the world ….”[31] Commerce was thus an early example of high schools designed for the
masses, and of education that would map onto and sustain the economic trajectories of the nation and its growing
cities.
By the 1950s, the school primarily drew students from Lincoln Square, San Juan Hill, and areas north of the
neighborhood, which were comprised of primarily working-class African American, Haitian, Latino (majority Puerto
Rican), and White residents.[32] By the early 1960s, Commerce was one of two Manhattan high schools to which
Black and Latino students were generally assigned if they did not attend school in the zone where they lived.[33]
Commerce had gained an image as a “troubled” school, and news accounts implied that increasing incidents of
violence were attributable to “incorrigible” youth from “underprivileged backgrounds, gangs, and broken families.” [34]
These descriptions of Commerce and its students were indicative of a larger discourse that was embedded within
the Slum Clearance and Community Development and Redevelopment program, an urban renewal project that
reshaped the area between the 1950s and 1970s. The program was part of the Housing Act of 1949, which called
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for the “elimination of slums by using public capital to acquire, demolish, and clear blighted areas.”[35]
Moreover, the program promoted reinvestment from the private sector through subsidized incentives by granting
eminent domain to local governments, along with critical funding and tax incentives that covered two-thirds to threequarters of the costs of land acquisition. While funds were made available to both state and local governments, the
majority of federal dollars in New York State were allocated to the redevelopment of New York City, where Robert
Moses headed Mayor William O’Dwyer’s Committee on Slum Clearance.[36] According to the New York City Urban
Renewal Authority (a federal agency), sites would be targeted for redevelopment in order to “eradicate rampant
deterioration and to stimulate private investment.” Under Moses’ leadership, by 1956 ten sites had been designated
for clearance.[37] Among these sites was Lincoln Square.
The Lincoln Square Urban Renewal Area initially began with eighteen square blocks between 60th and 66th Streets.
To ensure the project’s success, the authority acquired additional adjoining properties to the north and west to serve
as a buffer of “stable land.”[38] Moses’ vision, of a “reborn west side, marching north from Columbus circle, and
eventually spreading over the entire dismal and decayed west side,” was thus realized through the support of the
federal government, and resulted in the creation of two different renewal projects across the 2.4-plus square miles
of the West Side.[39]
Commerce High was located within the “stable land” area that was to serve as a buffer for the Lincoln Square Urban
Renewal Area, and like the residents of Lincoln Square, the students of Commerce were displaced.[40] In the spring
of 1965, Commerce was designated for demolition, and the majority of the students were sent to Brandeis High
School, a new comprehensive high school that was opening on 84th Street.[41] Thus, although it was “new,”
Brandeis inherited many of the students that Commerce formerly served, and many of the descriptors that had
qualified Commerce followed its students to Brandeis. In the years that followed, the neighborhood, along with the
city, continued to undergo processes of major racial and economic transformation, particularly accentuated by the
financial crisis of the 1970s and 1980s, when Brandeis, along with other comprehensive high schools, became
symbolic of an increasing moral panic.[42] Within this context, popular media portrayed Brandeis as a place of
violence, decay, non-learning, and undesirable populations. As a graduate of one of the city’s elite high schools (who
lived in the Brandeis High School area) recollects, by 1971 Brandeis was already being referred to as “the
Drugstore” or “the Gauntlet” that was increasingly avoided by many students and families.[43]
The racialized moral panic produced a response of white flight from the school system. Indeed, during the 1970s
and 1980s, the percentage of White families who sent their children to Brandeis shrunk considerably. On the Upper
West Side, as Jonathan Kozol has noted, this phenomenon was particularly ironic given the pronounced liberalism
that characterized the area.[44] Brandeis became known for its concentration of low-income students of color, many
of whom were also English language learners. Yet, despite the fact that Brandeis was increasingly portrayed (by
popular media as well as by city officials) as emblematic of urban blight, the neighborhood demographics were not
completely incongruent with that of Brandeis’s student population. The pre-1970s migration of Puerto Ricans,
Haitians, and African Americans to the area was accompanied by the beginning of an out-migration of older
residents from the neighborhood, and during the 1970s and 1980s the Upper West Side became “associated with
the indigent, poor, and bohemian elements of Manhattan.”[45]
Between the 1970s and the 1990s, however, the city increasingly supported the growth of retail and infrastructure of
services that would attract a wealthier population; and property values on the Upper West Side grew, as did the
median family income.[46] Beginning in the 1990s, the Upper West Side went through what real estate investors and
historians have described as a “renaissance” that was characterized by the development of a number of luxury
buildings and a steady increase in upper-income residents.[47] By 2006, the Upper West Side accounted for the
largest increase in home ownership throughout Manhattan, and 46 percent of surveyed households registered
within the top quintile of New York City incomes ($100,552+). Low-income households were either increasingly
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contained in rent-regulated apartment buildings, public housing projects, or homesteaded buildings. Many poor and
working-class families also migrated out of the neighborhood or outside of the city.[48] Amidst a changing urban
landscape, Brandeis High School had continued to accept the same students it always had, along with students
coming off of suspensions at other schools, released from incarceration, and other vulnerable or “at-risk”
populations. By the late 1990s and early 2000s, a number of high schools, including Brandeis, had been deemed
dangerous to the point that they required an increase in school safety agents (SSAs) and metal detectors.[49] Yet as
the area around 84th Street grew wealthier, there grew to be an increasingly visible racial and economic disjuncture
between the students inside of Brandeis and the community surrounding the school. In the next section, we explore
how this disjuncture was negotiated during the postmortem period of the school’s phase out, as new claims were
made to this once-abandoned place.
Postmortem Brandeis and the Cultural Logic of Academic Imaginaries
In 2009, following the rhetoric of NCLB reform, NYCDOE asserted that closing Brandeis was an act in service to the
very communities who had historically attended the school. Yet, as the number of students slowly diminished each
year that the phase out was in effect, missing from the proposals that circulated about what would replace the socalled failing school was any consideration of the low-income students of color whom the school had served.
Brandeis is part of New York City’s Community School District 3, which spans 59th Street to 122nd Street along the
West Side of Manhattan. Despite the gentrification and displacement that has impacted the area, and largely due to
a significant public housing stock, the majority of public school students in the district continue to be low-income
students of color.[50] Indeed, public housing and public schools like Brandeis are the few remaining institutions that
serve the low-income communities of color in the area. Yet, as the neighborhood that surrounds these institutions
changes, these low-income residents and students of color are increasingly out-of-place in the very places and
spaces that they have historically called home. In this section we examine how this disjuncture was negotiated
through the contestation that emerged over who would have the right to learn and grow in the Brandeis building as
the city, a charter management corporation, and middle-class families laid claim to a once-forgotten and longabandoned place.
Maia Cucchiara builds upon Miriam Greenberg’s concept of the urban imaginary (which refers to the ways that
cultural representations of cities are intentionally produced to work in tandem with global capital and labor needs) to
chart the production of a parallel academic imaginary in gentrifying downtown Philadelphia. As she finds, the rebranding of particular public schools was made possible by public–private partnerships between municipal
governments and business associations that marketed certain schools as neighborhood schools. These efforts, she
argues, were meant to appeal to middle-class families by positioning the re-branded schools as representative of a
specific type of urban life that relies upon an assumption of “families of similar status” who have come together to
create an “idealized urban space dominated by a middle-class ethos, an ‘urban village’ of sorts where families of
similar status who share key norms and values experience the best of city life.” [51]
The alignment between the NYCDOE and a charter management company that propelled the academic imaginary
of Upper West Success is well illustrated by the comments below, made by NYCDOE Deputy Chancellor of Portfolio
Planning Marc Sternberg:

If the presence of a charter school in a community will keep a family in the New York City public
school system, a family that might have been able to afford private school or that might have
considered moving to the suburbs because of the schools there, then we’ve done our job.[52]

However, these moments of disclosure (of who is prioritized within the structuring of public services) are rare. In the
paragraphs that follow, we examine the cultural logic that propelled the academic imaginary of Upper West Success
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that—characterized by themes of neighborhood and community and a rhetoric of rights and choice—was grounded
upon the implicit exclusion of low-income communities of color. Although they were written out of the future of who
would grow and learn in the Brandeis building, the Black and Brown students representative of Brandeis past were
critical to the construction of the academic imaginary of Upper West Success. They were, after all, the figures
against which an imagined community was constructed.
One of the first indicators of Upper West Success’s academic imaginary was a pronounced shift in clientele targeted
by the marketing campaign for the 84th Street iteration of the charter network. At the time, SCN already operated a
number of schools further uptown (including a significant number of schools in the same district), where it had
pitched its schools to low-income Black and Latino families as a necessary alternative to public schools that, like
Brandeis, were historically under-funded, ignored, and long-abandoned.[53] However, the aggressive marketing
campaign undertaken by SCN began even before October 2010, when the State University of New York (SUNY)
Charter Institute officially approved the creation of Upper West Success.
New York City charter schools are not required to adhere to the same regulations and requirements that govern
public schools. Unlike most public schools, then, charters do not have to solely serve the students of a particular
residential area: they usually agree to accept a certain percentage of local students, and outline this in their
contractual agreements with the city and state, or literally, in their charters. Utilizing this freedom, SCN aggressively
marketed itself in particular areas north and south of 84th Street—while ignoring other areas of the district that had
been slower to gentrify. [54] The aggressive marketing campaign undertaken by SCN began even before October
2010, when the State University of New York (SUNY) Charter Institute officially approved the creation of Upper West
Success.
As part of its marketing strategies, SCN held open houses to recruit potential families. These open houses were
held regularly at the Jewish Community Center as well as in private apartments along Central Park West and
included wine and expensive hors d’oeuvres. In addition to the open houses, Upper West Success created glossy
brochures, and advertisements were purchased on Google.com. Strikingly missing from early versions of the
brochures were the faces of any children who were identifiably of color, and for the first months of SCN’s advertising
campaign, no applications were available in Spanish, even though the district continues to have a large Latino and
Spanish-speaking student population.[55] SCN’s recruitment messaging, conveyed through its fliers and brochures,
declared Upper West Success Academy the “public-school solution to private-school tuition.” At community
meetings where the charter school was discussed, appeals made by advocates for the charter school were unified
by an argument that SCN was a response to the needs of an increasingly diverse population that resulted from
gentrification.[56]
Yet the academic imaginary of Upper West Success was constructed by a confluence of interests and a diversity of
actors that reached well beyond SCN. Indeed, at several public meetings held about the creation of the school,
White and middle-income families became increasingly vocal about asserting their rights to neighborhood and
community schools. And these rights-based claims were constructed in opposition to racialized images of Brandeis
students.
The following comments are taken from a popular blog about New York City public schools and respond to an article
posted about the closure of Brandeis and the opening of Upper West Success[57] :

Why can’t this/these schools serve the community, which needs them, rather than bused-in children?
*
Why do they put a school for the worst kids in the city in an otherwise wonderful neighborhood. The
tax payers of the UWS are already going to have to subsidize every aspect of these kids lives, from
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their single mother’s welfare checks, to their food stamps, to the public transportation that brings
them to school, to their “education”, to their future incarceration, BUT we also have to tolerate them
bringing their “thug-life” mindset to the stroller packed streets of the UWS….. Whatever they want to
do, let them do it in their own neighborhoods.
*
I, for one, am not sad to see this school go. Let’s stop walking around the problem; the students, if
you could even call them that, are the problem. Not the administration, not the new standards for
school evaluation, and certainly not the teachers. These kids are leeches to society, they only cause
harm….punk ass kids. You know exactly what kind of kids I’m talking about.
*
…. here on the Upper West Side, we have one sought-after high school… that can accommodate
only a small fraction of our kids who apply, so they are also travelling around the city. Why not reopen
Brandeis as a neighborhood high school? What am I missing?
*
… Get rid of the students who are the problem. Stop being so politically correct and careing for the
students who disrupt the learning process. Get rid of the problem and schools won’t have to CLOSE.
[sic]

These commentators not only position Brandeis students as problematic, but as the problem: as the cause for the
failure of the school and its necessary closure. Moreover, according to the first commentator, Brandeis students not
only harm the school, they harm society as a whole. Importantly, the commentators, who locate themselves as
residents of the Upper West Side, position these depictions of Brandeis students against the community, or more
specifically, their community.
These concepts of community and neighborhood are buoyed by a particular rhetoric of rights and choice that has
come to be palpable on the Upper West Side in conversations about whom the district’s schools should serve and
prioritize.[58] Embedded within these discussions is a joined logic of the market and rights: of those who deserve
their rights, and those who don’t. And, as evidenced by the example below, race and class contour the fault lines
between the two.
On a January evening in 2011, the NYCDOE held (as required by law) a Joint Public Hearing about the opening of
Upper West Success Academy.[59] The hearing was held in the Brandeis building’s auditorium, and on their way
down the stairs to the meeting, while waiting to add their names to the attendance and speakers’ lists, parents and
community members commented on how well-kept the building was, and what a difference the recent building
renovations had made; $22 million had just been put into the building to update it when the smaller high schools
were opened. Close to 400 people were in attendance. Over 100 parents, teachers, students, and elected officials
spoke both in favor of and against the charter school. As the hearing was called to order, Sheila, a middle-aged
White woman, scurried in and looked for an empty seat. She found one near the front and sat down—and as she
nestled in her seat, she talked about the reasons she had come out that night. Like most mothers, Sheila wanted a
good school for her child. Upper West Success was important, she believed, because a school that served the
community was needed. According to Sheila, too many “Brooklyn grandmothers” who didn’t even live in the area
had gained access to the district’s schools.
Implied in Sheila’s comments are raced and classed based references to women—raising their children’s children—
who are supposedly cheating the system by working hard to ensure that their children get a good education,
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sometimes by shuttling them back and forth for hours every day on long cross-borough journeys. In contrast to
these imagined grandmothers is the notion that those who have chosen to move to the Upper West Side are thereby
entitled to and deserving of a particular set of public goods and services.[60] See, for example, the following quote
from the Upper West Success Academy’s website, about the need for the school:

There are lots of high quality public schools on the Upper West Side. That’s why many of us chose
this neighborhood in the first place and why so many new families continue to move in. The problem
is: there are not enough of these great schools to meet current demand.[61]

Proprietary claims such as the one above position the problem, “there are not enough great schools to meet the
current demand,” as one of supply shortage, not of structural inequality. According to this market-based logic, rights
—even to public goods that are supposed to be universal, such as public education—are contingent upon choices
that are predicated on economic wealth. As Stuart Hall explains, concepts of difference and choice have significantly
guided the economic and political restructuring of recent decades. As such, the citizen consumer is confronted with
a differentiation of public goods. This differentiation is accompanied by a growing inequality as well as a increased
onus on the citizen consumer to make the right choice. As Hall notes, this structuring of public goods as market
goods excepts the state from guaranteeing that all hospitals and schools, for example, are excellent. [62] Such
reasoning, as exemplified within the academic imaginary of Upper West Success, anticipates exclusion.
In the end, the combined forces of City, SCN, and the middle-class families won, and SCN was slated to open in the
fall of 2011. But as Upper West Success Academy got ready to open its doors, a range of other issues needed to be
addressed: How would a school that was built for high-school students physically accommodate kindergarteners?
Woven into these debates about renovations that needed to be made to adjust the building to smaller students was
the question of metal detectors—would kindergarteners really be expected to pass through these machines? Rather
than remove the policing infrastructure from the school altogether, another solution was devised: a separate
entrance so that Upper West Success Academy students would not be required to pass through the checkpoints that
would continue to operate as usual for the “big kids” with whom the school was being shared.
Indeed, even as the students themselves disappear, the figures of Brandeis students remain. The fall of 2011
marked the entrance of the first group of Upper West Success students and the last group of Brandeis students.
That same year, at a Community Education Council [63] meeting held in a small room at the district’s offices on 93rd
Street, a few parents—all of whom were White—chatted before the meeting began. They were discussing, with
concern, a recent incident of violence that involved an older and a younger student. The first question asked was,
“Was it Brandeis kids?” It was not, yet their figures, or perhaps the shadows of their Black and Brown bodies that
represented a threat to these parents, loomed.
In many ways, Upper West Success is an exaggerated symptom of a much older problem: how some remain
consistently forgotten while the futures of others continue to be well-secured. Yet the cultural logic that emerges in
the postmortem period of the phase out of Brandeis and in the struggles that ensued over what would take its place
elides this reality; and dispossession—propelled by a group of would-be concerned villagers claiming that this onceabandoned place should serve the community’s children—appears not only just, but also driven by concepts of
community and neighborhood and a rhetoric of rights, and choice.
Conclusion
That Brandeis was going to be closed came as no surprise to many. The NYCDOE had been closing a number of
schools throughout the city, most often with no consultation with school workers, students, or parents. After hearing
the news that Brandeis would be closed, one school worker commented, “We’ve been waiting for the other shoe to
drop for years.” However, part of the story that gets lost amidst the echoes that surround this seemingly inevitable
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“drop,” marked by the decision to close Brandeis, reveals the slow violence of education reform and illuminates a
much longer trajectory of a decades-long project of abandonment that extends well beyond the city’s 2009 decision.
Rob Nixon defines slow violence as:

. . . a violence that occurs gradually and out of sight, a violence of delayed destruction that is
dispersed across time and space, an attritional violence that is not typically viewed as violence at all.
Violence is customarily conceived as an event or action that is immediate in time, explosive and
spectacular in space, and as erupting into instant sensational visibility. We need, I believe, to engage
a different kind of violence, a violence that is neither spectacular nor instantaneous, but rather
incremental and accretive, its calamitous repercussions playing out across a range of temporal
scales. [64]

Stretching Nixon’s theory of environmental injustice to apply to public education, the city’s 2009 announcement of
the closing can be considered a flashpoint and “newsworthy” event. Yet the slow violence that produced Brandeis
remained relatively invisible, persistently active beneath the surface for decades. It worked through the state-driven
reforms that have claimed to redress unequal learning conditions. This violence also worked in tandem with
decades of state-sponsored urban renewal programs that silently (and sometimes not so silently) worked to displace
long-term residents and produce what is now the Upper West Side of Manhattan, and create a situation in which
Brandies students were out-of-place. And it continued through an emergent cultural logic that grounded the
academic imaginary of Upper West Success.
For neighborhoods like the Upper West Side, schools are some of the few institutions through which low-income
communities of color find each other in the wake of this multi-layered, slow, yet steady violence; and through which
shared histories are still remembered and told. Before Upper West Success developers bid on space in the
Brandeis building, they had first tried to obtain space at a nearby public elementary school that was not slated for
closure but which, according to the NYCDOE, was under-utilized. The parents and teachers at this school organized
quickly. They were able to fight back against the charter school co-location. Amidst the organizing meetings, several
stories emerged: of teachers who had taught there for decades, of families who had been part of the school for at
least three generations, and of school workers who had attended the school themselves. Like so many other
schools, and also like Brandeis, this school was more than a building; it was a place that held these histories, of the
daily acts of growing up, of working, and of the gendered labor of caretaking and raising children. Indeed, as one
former New York City public school student reflected in a public meeting on education reform held in December
2010, “If they close the school, how are you supposed to go to your reunion?”
The question posed indicates what is at stake: a continued dispossession that threatens the capacity of a
community to survive. The case of Brandeis and Upper West Success indicates a renewed forgetting and
abandonment of a place and its people. We write through the postmortem lens of Brandeis’s phase out not to lament
its closure. Rather, we hope that by chronicling how Brandeis went from being a long-forgotten place to one that
was sought after, we might inform potential strategies that interrupt the variegated forms and speeds of violence that
continue to circulate through public schools and the people who inhabit them.
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